Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999)

Yeon-Koo Che

doi:10.1006/game.1999.0782

Suscripción institucional·Artículo·2000·Inglés

Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999)

Yeon-Koo Che

Crossref

Cómo citar

Yeon-Koo Che (2000). Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999). https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0782

Ver en la fuente DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0782