Modelos Probit para flujos de migración de datos agrupados: una nota teórica

Resumen

This paper studies the interaction between production subsidies and innovation subsidies. Wedevelop a model which allows us to calculate the socially optimal subsidies (and how they varywith changes in the economic environment), and to understand how firms react to each type ofsubsidy. In a three-stage game, the government chooses production and innovation subsidies inthe first stage to maximize welfare in the presence of a shadow cost of public funds; two firmsinvest in cost-reducing RD and the two firms compete in quantities in thelast stage. we find that production subsidies crowd out innovation. On the other hand, providinga production subsidy reduces the cost of the innovation subsidy, and vice versa. The optimalproduction subsidy either increases monotonically with spillovers, or is U-shaped with respect tospillovers, depending on exogenous parameters. The innovation subsidy is increasing in spillovers. The production subsidy is higher for very low spillovers, while the innovation subsidy is higher formoderate/high spillovers. In equilibrium, because of the innovation subsidy, R&D increases withspillovers, and so does welfare. We also consider the case of a financially constrained government,as well as the case of a uniform subsidy to production and innovation costs.