Ecuador

Resumen

This chapter looks at Ecuador (1998–2008) to introduce yet another variation in power asymmetry: situations in which the Opposition splits. This split allows the Incumbent to form an alliance with former Opposition groups, thus permitting more expansion of presidential powers relative to the status quo. One of this book’s messages is that Incumbents require a large pro-Incumbent asymmetry to achieve their preferences. This chapter complicates this argument, showing how splits among non-Incumbent forces help the president achieve these goals—at a cost. In Ecuador, non-Incumbent forces split between traditional, region-based parties and newly mobilized nontraditional actors. One nontraditional actor—an indigenous group—also split, with one section supporting the president and the other becoming anti-Incumbent. The availability of so many nontraditional actors to form alliances with the Incumbent led to a remarkable pro-Incumbent table asymmetry. This alliance, however, required the Incumbent to offer concessions to nontraditional actors.